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Linking Mine Action and
Development: Local-level
Benefits and Challenges
In many post-conflict regions, landmines and explosive remnants of war1 remain, limiting
recovery and development even after mine-clearance projects are completed. A number of
mine-clearance organizations are starting to promote “linking mine action and development”
as a better alternative to a separate and uncoordinated approach.

by Russell Gasser [ Humanitarian Technology Consulting Ltd. ]

T

here are few things more discouraging than land that has
been painstakingly demined only to remain unused following
clearance. Cleared land that goes unused because use of that
land is not a development priority is a waste of money and effort. In
addition, the risk of deminer injury or death for no obvious benefit is
frustrating and demoralizing.
If land that is considered a high priority for community or economic development can also be prioritized for clearance, there can
be some valuable results and the benefits can multiply. Linking mine
action and development not only helps to eliminate wasted demining
but also has the ability to optimize the impact of mine action in several
other ways. However, linking mine action with development has some
serious consequences for the way that mine clearance undertakes both
prioritization and clearance at a local level.
Broad interest in linking mine action and development has led to a
“contact group,” consisting primarily of representatives attending the
States Parties meetings for the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention. 2
The group also includes other invited partners and is coordinated
through the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.
In June 2008, the GICHD published extensive draft guidelines for linking MA and development for development partners, mine-affected
states, official development agencies and mine-action organizations. 3
What Does “Linking MA and Development” Really Mean?
One current definition of this approach states that linking mine
action and development simply means that mine action is aligned with
broader development priorities and programs at all levels. This definition is based on the recognition that landmines and explosive remnants
of war constrain post-conflict reconstruction and development.4 Linking
the two is not a single option, however, nor is it a simple yes or no decision. There is an entire spectrum of possible relationships between mine
action and development, with no one correct approach suitable for all
situations. Here are some of the possibilities:
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No relationship, no linkage. In this case, mine action and development work independently, with separate goals, and separate prioritization and project-selection mechanisms. Development agencies adhering
to this approach are likely to regard mine-contaminated areas as inaccessible, deciding not to plan development projects in these areas.
Leader-follower relationship. Usually, development staff wait for demining to be completed before starting development projects. Sometimes,
mine action waits until development funding is available before starting mine-action work. Initial planning of development work in areas
intended to be cleared may be undertaken, but there is a likely delay
between the end of demining and the start of development activities.
Development priorities in this case may not be able to make the best use
of completed mine clearance.
Coordination. In this option, mine action and development are
informed of each other’s priorities, and work together as far as possible without a major change in approach to either. Coordination can
lead to much shorter delays in take-up of cleared land, but it does not
significantly change the prioritization of mine action to take development needs into full account. For example, the actions most needed to
address the causes of poverty in a region may not be those indicated by
the Landmine Impact Survey data used to decide demining priorities.
Support and promote. Using this approach, mine action supports
development by giving priority to work in areas where development
projects are to be funded. These areas may be given higher priority within
an existing priority mechanism, for example, by considering overall
socioeconomic and development impact beyond the Landmine Impact
Survey data. Also, mine action may be started in these areas by working
outside of, and therefore effectively ignoring, the established national
or regional priority-setting mechanism. Mine-action organizations and
structures may themselves promote development in areas that have
been cleared or are about to be cleared. Mine action follows established
technical approaches and generally works in the same way as usual,
irrespective of the nature of the development activities.

Integration. In this final possibility, mine action is fully
integrated with development, as prioritization and implementation are based on the overall development impact and
not the mine-action impact alone. A low-priority suspected
hazardous area that is a severe blockage to development
might be cleared ahead of medium- or high-priority SHAs,
as defined by mine-action priorities. This approach goes a
significant step further than the use of socioeconomic data
in prioritization by using key development goals as the overriding criteria. Mine-action methods, especially demining
methods, may need to be significantly altered to increase
overall development impact. This approach to demining
is likely to result in mine clearance that is more expensive
and less efficient than optimized mine clearance. However,
losing efficiency in the mine-action part of a project may
allow for far greater gains in costs and efficiency in the
overall development project. Full linkage of mine action
and development requires that a large-scale development
view be used in setting priorities and determining costs.
Timing can be a key requirement for linkage between
mine action and development. Selecting the tasks that are
going to hold up the “critical path” for the overall development activities as the highest priority is different from
a national or local mine-action center setting priorities
to clear as efficiently as possible. This may not be an easy
or entirely comfortable shift in roles and responsibilities.
Enabling this transition without causing mine-action specialists to feel that they have to play “second fiddle” to
development planners while ensuring that they do not
feel that this transition diluted the authority and lowered
the standing of mine action, will require care. The closer
the linkage, the more change may be necessary to mineclearance prioritization and implementation. Without

A farmer in Bosnia-Herzegovina returns to his land after it was cleared
but finds there are still mines very close to the area.
All photos courtesy of the author

This bridge in Angola was demined but not repaired.

a clear understanding of what linking MA and development is about and an understanding of the potential benefits of this change, the loss of hard-won efficiency and
impact is not likely to be welcomed by deminers.
Full linkage of demining and development demands a new paradigm for mine
action at a local level, where clearance is seen as an enabling activity or a service in
support of development, rather than a separate activity or a precursor to development. When fully linked to development goals, mine action is a “team player,” with a
specific role of ensuring that it makes the greatest possible contribution to reducing
poverty by enabling development, a significant change from the role of maximizing
the reduction of the humanitarian or socioeconomic impact of mines.
Examples of Local Linkages
Angola. Clearance and verification of roads are key in assisting the return of
refugees and internally displaced persons to their villages. In some regions, roads that
are mined, or believed to be mined, can rapidly become overgrown and impenetrable,
so there is no way to find out what lies along the former route. In some areas there are
rivers that need replacement of substantial bridges that are 5 meters (16 feet) long or
more. Unless bridges are rebuilt, roads cannot be used by vehicles, and if they remain
unused for several years while money and materials are found to build a bridge, then
the vegetation will return and the roads will disappear again. Local memory of what
is still a suspected area and what has been cleared can be fickle, and rumors that the
mine-free road is not used because it is still not safe can start and spread. Linking
mine clearance to civil works like bridge building has obvious benefits in cases
like these.
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following mine clearance of their house and land,
a family returned to their small farm in a former heavily mined area. Life was not
easy, but a living could be made. When the young daughter of the family reached
school age, however, the family seriously considered moving back to the nearest
town, as there was no affordable transport available to take her to and from school.
Demining the village could have been in vain if the children did not have access to
education. If the farmers left the area again, the funds invested in road repairs and
support to agriculture, as well as demining, would be wasted and the local economy
set back. Like many development problems, this issue was unexpected and required
community involvement, acting with the municipal authorities, to find a solution
based on a bus service. Mine-action prioritization alone cannot address or resolve
problems like these. 5
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Southeast Europe. Finally, there is another
case from Southeast Europe, where a large
development agency was planning a substantial project in support of rural reconstruction.
The funding timetable was set and required
tight coordination of the various aspects
of the project if the ambitious goals were to
be achieved. Should the whole project be
delayed, risking a reduction of the impact, or
even a total loss of financial support, to allow
12 months and a lot of money for mine clearance of affected areas? Or, should the minecontaminated areas suffer “double jeopardy”
by being excluded from the development
funding in order to keep the rest of the project
on track and on budget?
Linking mine action and development
may offer a potential solution that is outside
the usual way of working and prioritizing of
demining: gradual clearance, which aims to
clear just enough land, just in time, to ensure
that key intermediate development goals of
the overall large project can be met. One part
of the project, for example, building up a goat
farm, was planned to take several years, but
the necessary land was mined. Immediate demining of access routes and the key buildings was needed so that the infrastructure

could be rehabilitated before the project
started. Demining of the first part of the pasture could, if necessary, wait a year. Clearing
further buildings would take a little longer, but finally, as the herd of goats gradually increased, the rest of the pasture would
be cleared. This all makes for slow, inefficient
and hence relatively expensive demining, but
the overall gains in development activities
could be considerable. In this approach, prioritization and task planning for mine clearance would be dominated by the development
project and its time frame and not by demining or LIS criteria.
Conclusion
Many approaches exist concerning demining and its connection to development within
affected communities. Clearance projects can
be successfully completed, but afterward the
cleared land remains unused, as no development program exists to assist the community
in rebuilding what was lost through war and
violence. Linking MA and development helps
to ensure that clearance projects in mined
communities are not in vain by approaching
the process in a new, more integrated way.
See Endnotes, page 110
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Injury, Fire, Lack of Funding Complicate Demining in Lebanon
While most of the immediate landmine danger has been removed from southern Lebanon along its border with Israel, multiple
factors have complicated the demining process throughout the country. In southern Lebanon, 43 percent of the contaminated
land has been fully cleared, while another 49 percent was surface-cleared, according to the Mine Action Coordination Centre,
South Lebanon. UNMACC–SL has been a leading force in clearing mines in this area; however, because of a lack of funding,
many of its clearance teams stopped work at the end of August 2008. As a result, the injury rate is expected to escalate because, as in the past, locals will likely attempt to remove contaminants themselves when they face a lack of assistance.
In late July 2008, a Lebanese citizen, Abbas Akout, working with the Mines Advisory Group, was injured by a cluster bomb that
detonated near him while he was attempting to disarm landmines in Zwatar, a village in southern Lebanon. The cluster bomb
was identified as one of the bombs dropped by Israel in southern Lebanon during 2006. Akout sustained moderate damage to
his hands and feet. More than 50 Lebanese and international workers, as well as over 250 civilians, have already been injured
by these cluster bombs.
Also in July, emergency crews fighting a forest fire in the Bmikin region of Lebanon faced a unique challenge: extinguishing a
fire in an area where cluster munitions from the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006, as well as landmines from the Lebanese Civil
War, were still polluting the land. The resulting explosions and decreased safety of the area caused several hectares of forest
(one hectare equals approximately 2.5 acres) to be destroyed before the fire was eventually extinguished.

United Nations
The U.N. has indicated that the demining operations in Lebanon may need to be eliminated without extra funding. The U.S.
Department of State has given an initial sum of US$825,000 and is working with the American Task Force in Lebanon in the search for
additional funding to keep the program afloat.
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On 30 May 2008, the international community adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions.1 It is little wonder that those who were against a convention of this sort are still reeling from the shock of it. Africa, on the
other hand, can give itself a well-deserved pat on the back for having played a pivotal role in the adoption of
a groundbreaking, legally-binding instrument of which posterity will judge the results.
by Sheila Mweemba [ Zambia Mine Action Centre ]

A

t the first meeting of the cluster-ban process in Oslo, Norway,
in February 2007, there were four African countries present:
Angola, Egypt, Mozambique and South Africa. Only three
states, however, signed the Oslo Declaration at the end of the conference: Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. A little over a year ago, at
the Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, Africa’s participation in the
Oslo Process2 began in earnest. There were 14 states present, and consistent with the continent’s overall stance on general and complete disarmament, these states spoke out against the dreadful weapons.
Thereafter, more African countries began to participate in the cause.
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia
became actively engaged in the Oslo Process. At the Livingstone African
Conference on Cluster Munitions, held from 31 March to 1 April 2008,
in Livingstone, Zambia, the countries of Libya, Namibia and Tunisia,
never before part of the process, were in attendance. Thirty-nine African
countries declared that the continent neither wanted the “continued uncontrolled proliferation of destructive weapons” on the continent nor to be the
“dumping ground for weapons obsolete in other parts of the world.”3
Africa’s Expectations for the CCM Negotiations
For Africa, the Convention on Cluster Munitions would address the
negative humanitarian effects of these weapons. Since the continent
is already plagued by crises—including inadequate health care and a
lack of financial, technological and human-resource capacities—it was
imperative that strong language be included, particularly on definitions,
victim assistance and international cooperation and assistance (i.e.,
Articles 2, 5 and 6 respectively of the Convention on Cluster Munitions).
Africa, in its deliberations during the Dublin Diplomatic Conference
held in Ireland, felt that assistance in whatever form—technical, financial or human—was vital, especially for poor countries that lack these
capacities. In addition, African representatives wanted to avoid the
inclusion of a clause permitting a transition period or any tolerance of
interoperability language (i.e., joint military operations with countries
not adhering to the ban).
After a position was determined, the 38 participating African countries present spoke as one through Zambia. Four African states (Egypt,
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Libya) also participated as observers, attending
meetings and expressing their own views. Strategy meetings were held
every day during lunch breaks and served as an opportunity for information exchange and feedback. Zambia, as the coordinator, had assigned
different countries to take the lead for the African Group in different
parallel informal sessions and report back to the full group meetings.
For instance, Malawi was the lead for Article 21 (interoperability), Sierra
Leone for Article 5 (victim assistance), Ghana for Article 2 (definitions)

Cluster Munition Coalition campaign workshop held prior to the official Kampala Conference. North African CMC campaigners Ayman Sorour of Protection (Egypt), left, and Rachid
Dahmani of Handicap International–Algeria.
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and Uganda for Article 4 (clearance) discussions. This system allowed
Africa to be well represented and have its views effectively expressed.
Definitions. At the Livingstone Conference, Africa discussed contentious issues at length and agreed on common positions. On the issue
of definitions, the African consensus was that the draft convention to
be negotiated in Dublin should provide a categorical prohibition for the
stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions as a whole category, with no distinction over what type may be considered good or
bad. This approach was deemed critical to making an effective convention for the protection of civilians. It was argued that this strategy would
make cluster munitions a stigmatized weapon. Africa also preferred that
Article 2(c) be deleted from the draft, as its presence provided for an
opportunity for exceptions to be included.
In Livingstone, Africa (apart from South Africa, which highlighted
the military utility of the weapons in terms of their accuracy in pointtargeting) opted for a total ban on cluster munitions. In the African
view, no cluster munition causes acceptable harm to civilians. In
Dublin, however, a compromise was reached to limit exceptions—essentially banning about 98 percent of cluster munitions currently in use. It
was critical to Africa’s position that this compromise was not used to
exclude cluster munitions that had the same intolerable effects as cluster
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